Új hozzászólás Aktív témák

• #2837 S_x96x_S addikt

  Új Válasz 2020-03-07 02:42:41 #2837

  Új hozzászólás

  Összes hozzászólása itt Válaszok az összes hozzászólására itt Válaszok erre a hozzászólásra

  Privát üzenet küldése

  

  S_x96x_S

  addikt

  péntek esti - AMD security issue ; remélem lesz rá javítás
  ( Érdekesség: részben az Intel szponzorálta[1] a kutatást )

  TLDR: "Our attacks demonstrate that AMD’s design is vulnerable to side-
  channel attacks. However, we propose countermeasures in software
  and hardware, allowing to secure existing implementations and
  future designs of way predictors."
  [1] "Additional funding was provided by generous gifts from Intel."
  
  Azért rendes az Inteltől, hogy költ az AMD chipek biztonságosságára
  
  ----------
  AMD | Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and counter-
  measures; Operating systems security.
  https://t.co/gQ4cN9PYsX?amp=1 ( PDF)
  "Take A Way: Exploring the Security Implications of AMD’s
  Cache Way Predictors"

  "To optimize the energy consumption and performance of their
  CPUs, AMD introduced a way predictor for the L1-data (L1D) cache
  to predict in which cache way a certain address is located. Conse-
  quently, only this way is accessed, significantly reducing the power
  consumption of the processor.
  In this paper, we are the first to exploit the cache way predic-
  tor. We reverse-engineered AMD’s L1D cache way predictor in
  microarchitectures from 2011 to 2019, resulting in two new attack
  techniques. With Collide+Probe, an attacker can monitor a vic-
  tim’s memory accesses without knowledge of physical addresses
  or shared memory when time-sharing a logical core. With Load+
  Reload, we exploit the way predictor to obtain highly-accurate
  memory-access traces of victims on the same physical core. While
  Load+Reload relies on shared memory, it does not invalidate the
  cache line, allowing stealthier attacks that do not induce any last-
  level-cache evictions.
  We evaluate our new side channel in different attack scenarios.
  We demonstrate a covert channel with up to 588.9 kB/s, which we
  also use in a Spectre attack to exfiltrate secret data from the kernel.
  Furthermore, we present a key-recovery attack from a vulnerable
  cryptographic implementation. We also show an entropy-reducing
  attack on ASLR of the kernel of a fully patched Linux system, the
  hypervisor, and our own address space from JavaScript. Finally, we
  propose countermeasures in software and hardware mitigating the
  presented attacks."

Új hozzászólás Aktív témák